

### Memorandum

Date: 11/15/2023

### 

Subject: Docket Submission of Meeting with Robert Bosch LLC

From: Lawrence Blincoe LAWRENCE Digitally signed by LAWRENCE J BLINCOE Director, Office of Regulatory Analysis and Evaluation J BLINCOE

To: Docket Number: NHTSA-2023-0021 Light Vehicle Automatic Emergency Braking

Through: Terrence Sommers Assistant Chief Counsel Vehicle Safety Standards and Harmonization



Digitally signed by SARA R BENNETT Date: 2023.11.15 14:52:50 -05'00'

Date: 2023.11.15 14:30:30 -05'00'

On November 2, 2023, staff from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) met with Robert Bosch LLC (Bosch). The subject of the meeting focused on additional information related to NHTSA's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) proposing to require improved automatic emergency braking (AEB) performance in light vehicles. During the meeting Bosch presented slides discussing their AEB systems and issues related to vehicle testing including repeatability, concerns over false positives, and test speeds among others. A copy of this presentation is docketed together with this memorandum. In addition, Bosch discussed various issues related to hardware requirements that might be needed to meet the requirements of the NPRM. Bosch noted that the portion of their system sales that are single camera only were estimated to be less than 5%. Bosch also noted that the performance of available integrated systems (involving either dual cameras or cameras and radar), evolves over time and that upgraded systems with more advanced performance would typically not cost significantly more than previous integrated systems due to cost learning over time.

Please submit this memorandum to Docket No. NHTSA-2023-0021.

Attendees included:

#### NHTSA

- Larry Blincoe •
- Thomas Kang •
- Sean Puckett
- Natalia Leszczyszyn •
- Markus Price •
- Jav Chen •
- Joshua Fikentscher

• Sara Bennett

#### **ROBERT BOSCH LLC**

- Ana Meuwissen, Director of Federal Government Affairs
- Ryan Rummer, Engineering Vice President, Cross Domain Computing Solutions
- Dr. Stephan Benz, Chief Expert Political Consulting, Cross Domain Computing Solutions,
- Mariana Eichel, Marketing and Strategy Manager, Cross domain Computing Solutions
- Clayton Lindgrin, Senior Analyst, Federal Regulatory Affairs
- Angela Dragen, Legal Counsel, Robert Bosch LLC

## Vehicle safety technology

Automatic emergency braking

### **Ryan Rummer**

Engineering Vice President Regional Business Unit Leader ADAS & Automated Driving Cross-Domain Computing Solutions

### Dr. Stefan Benz

Chief Expert Political Consulting Cross-Domain Computing Solutions

### Mariana Eichel

Marketing and Strategy Manager Cross-Domain Computing Solutions

#### Ana Meuwissen Director of Federal Government Affairs

Clayton Lindgren

Senior Analyst, Federal Regulatory Affairs

### Angela Dragan

Legal Counsel Robert Bosch LLC

BOSCH

# NHTSA NPRM AEB and PAEB Agenda

- 1. Introduction
- 2. Bosch's general feedback
- 3. AEB systems
- 4. Car-to-car scenarios
- 5. Car-to-pedestrians
- 6. Questions




### Bosch Automotive Radar Over 25 Years of Experience and Excellence in Radar Business





Bosch Radar sensors are key components from **safety** features (e.g., AEB, BSD), **comfort** features L1-L2 (e.g., ACC), up to **automated** features L3





We address all relevant sensor configurations & trim levels

AEB: Automatic emergency braking; BSD: Blind spot detection; ACC: Adaptive cruise control



### Bosch Automotive Cameras Bosch video experience





Bosch Automotive Cameras are key components for **safety** features (e.g., AEB, BSD), **comfort** features L1-L2 (e.g., ACC), up to **automated** features L3





#### Automotive Camera

We address all relevant sensor configurations & trim levels

AEB: Automatic emergency braking; BSD: Blind spot detection; ACC: Adaptive cruise control



Λ

### NHTSA NPRM AEB and PAEB Bosch Comments Highlights

1) Bosch strongly supports the goals of NHTSA's proposal

New FMVSS requiring AEB and PAEB for passenger vehicles



#### **2)** Current AEB systems

The NPRM indicates NHTSA's understanding that all vehicles already possess the necessary hardware for AEB. However, it is important to note that while some vehicles in the market are already equipped with high-end AEB systems with advanced capabilities, certain other models in the market might require significant hardware updates, such as the inclusion of more advanced sensors

### 3) Higher performance

From the perspective of robustness and reproducibility, the proposed regulation would reach the technical performance limits of current series AEB and PAEB systems



#### 5) Car-to-Pedestrian

We suggest the following requirements for technical feasibility in Car to Pedestrian scenarios.

- Allow repetitions for failed tests
- Allow additional lighting like Euro NCAP or allow automatic high beam

BOSCH

#### 4) Car-to-Car

- We suggest allowing multiple repetitions of a scenario and collision mitigation instead of avoidance at higher velocities.
- Reduce relative velocity reduction of AEB/CIB to 60 kph
- Reduce relative velocity reduction of EBA/DBS to 70 kph
- Increase the headway to >16 m for a time gap >0.7 s for higher ego velocities for the decelerating lead vehicle scenarios
- Specify the tests under realistic road conditions including road-markings on the test track



### **Bosch Comments** AEB requirements through SW updates

Current **Future** Outlook on AEB passenger car and pedestrian proposal AEB voluntary agreement (U.S.) Large field of view for detection 2R1V 3R1V 5R1V of crossing VRU (AEB pedestrian). 4R1V Intelligent speed assistance Emergency lane keeping AEB

- The NPRM infers that all vehicles already possess the necessary hardware
- Some vehicles on the market are already equipped with highend AEB systems with advanced capabilities, others are not.
- Certain models may require **significant hardware updates**, such as the inclusion of more advanced sensors (e.g., radar, cameras), increased computing power, and/or improved brake systems to meet the specified requirements.
- Majority of AEB systems are designed based on 2017 NHTSA-**IIHS voluntary agreement\***

6

#### Potential need for hardware updates in addition to software upgrades to ensure that new vehicles can meet the proposed requirements.

Radar with higher

Increased sensitivity for robust

& stable detection in longer

ranges & at higher speeds

performance

•



\*Passenger vehicles and light trucks





### Bosch Comments Lead Vehicle AEB Performance Tests

#### Lead vehicle AEB performance tests

 Achieving collision avoidance at higher relative velocities is nearing the technical feasibility of current series production technology.

#### **AEB Maximum speeds**


- Increasing AEB/CIB relative velocity reduction to 80kph may lead to more "false positives"
- Suggested reductions to address these challenges: AEB/CIB to 60kph and EBA/DBS to 70kph

#### Forward collision warning

 FCW may be more beneficial >30kph to help driver take appropriate action before the "last time to steer" occurs



### Bosch Comments True Positives vs False Positives




- An increase in False Positives affects
  - system acceptance
- Possible measures to address high False Positive rate
  - reduce True Positives
     => possible approach for NCAP
  - improve system
     developmental limitation
- Development limitations exist
  - robustness

system reaction but no threat

=> need for repetition of tests




### Bosch Comments Last Point to Steer vs Last Point to Brake




### Bosch Comments Warning dilemma of FCW

• Low speed – FCW before planned action of typical driver

### no FCW at low speeds (less than ~30kph)



High speed – FCW after a possible planned action of typical driver
 use FCW for high speeds (more than ~30kph)



time


### Bosch Comments Repetition of tests for both AEB and PAEB

#### **Repetitions of tests**

• Multiple repetitions of a scenario as well as collision mitigation instead of avoidance at higher velocities should be allowed (e.g., 2 out of 3, or 5 out of 7)

#### What is the problem?

- Mandating many test cases that all need to be passed in a single test run might lead to problems for vehicles with otherwise good AEB systems.
- Due to the nature of systems relying on environment sensors the probability to pass a test is (slightly) lower than 100%.









Single test per test case  $\implies$  9.6% chance of testing failure

- Mandating a large number of test cases that all need to be passed in a single test run might lead to
  problems for vehicles with otherwise good AEB systems.
- Let's <u>assume</u> the following parameters (example, not a real system):
- Probability p<sub>single</sub> to pass a single test case p<sub>single</sub> = 99%
   even an otherwise good AEB system might fail single tests, as this is a design constraint of systems based on environment sensors
- Total number of tests n needed to pass n = 10

Probability p<sub>fail</sub> to fail testing (with an otherwise good system)

$$\mathbf{p_{fail}} = 1 - p_{single}^{n} = 1 - 99\%^{10} = 9.6\%$$

Almost one out of ten vehicles (with an otherwise good system) will fail testing.





#### Two out of three per test case

- If you allow per test case a two out of three rule for tests to be passed:
- Using the same parameter:
- Probability p<sub>single</sub> to pass a single test case p<sub>single</sub> = 99%
   even an otherwise good AEB system might fail single tests, as this is a design constraint of systems based on environment sensors

#### Test case is passed for:

Pass	Pass	Pass	in the three single tests
Pass	Pass	Fail	in the three single tests
Pass	Fail	Pass	in the three single tests
Fail	Pass	Pass	in the three single tests





### 2 out of 3 per test case $\implies$ 0.3% chance of testing failure

Probability p<sub>pass</sub> to pass a test case:

 $\mathbf{p_{pass}} = p_{single}^{3} + 3 * p_{single}^{2} * (1 - p_{single}) = 97.03\% + 2.94\% = 99.97\%$ (Pass\*Pass\*Pass + Pass\*Pass\*Fail + Pass\*Fail\*Pass + Fail\*Pass\*Pass)

Probability p<sub>fail</sub> to fail testing (with the same system)

**p\_fail** =  $1 - p_{pass}^n = 1 - 99.97\%^{10} = 0.3\%$ 

Only 3 out of 1000 vehicles (with an otherwise good system) will fail testing.





### Does this make AEB systems less effective?

- "Wait a minute; This means that the system will be quite bad, as it only needs to work for 66% of all tests."
- Let's do the same math with 66% for p<sub>single</sub>: p<sub>single</sub> = 66%
- Probability p<sub>pass</sub> to pass a single test case:

 $\mathbf{p_{pass}} = p_{single}^3 + 3 * p_{single}^2 * (1 - p_{single}) = 28.75\% + 43.12\% =$ **71.87\%** 

Probability p<sub>fail</sub> to fail testing (with a system with only 66% probability to pass a single test):

**p\_fail** =  $1 - p_{\text{pass}}^n = 1 - 71.87\%^{10} = 96.32\%$   $\rightarrow$  Almost all cars would fail testing

Limiting the max. number of failed tests could address the concern that, otherwise, systems with insufficient performance might enter the market.



### Bosch Comments Critical headway at braking scenario


#### Headway for braking vehicle

#### Scenario as proposed by NHTSA:

- Both vehicle speeds 80 km/h
- Headway 12m
   time gap of 0.54s

#### Comments

Increase the headway to > 16 m for a time gap
 > 0.7 s for higher ego velocities for the decelerating lead vehicle scenarios



#### Issues:

- 1. Robust detection of deceleration of lead vehicle needs time
  - For time gaps <0.7s brake activation required before situation can be assessed robustly (e.g., multiple measurements, target tracking, etc.); latencies need to be taken into account
  - For time gaps >0.7s a robust detection would be possible
     => increase headway for this scenario to 16m
- 2. At 80 km/h, 0.54s time gap is not generally appropriate => many systems would trigger a driver warning to increase time gap
  - Suggestion to solve 0.5 s time gaps in the field by mandating "latent information systems" (informing the driver to increase time gap before the target brakes)



### Bosch Comments General feedback

#### **Test conditions**

- Specify the tests under realistic road conditions
- Allow additional lighting like Euro NCAP or allow automatic high beam
  - Critical hardware limitations for night-time PAEB is the performance of radar-vision fusion systems, where headlight quality has a significant impact on system performance.
  - Include repetitions for failed tests (e.g., 5 out of 7) and to allow additional lighting, or to allow automatic high beam for a better reproducibility and a more representative test scenario.

#### Mannequin appearance


- Outline of the NHTSA-approved testing equipment
  - Requirements for pedestrian testing equipment, specify the approved platforms, such as belt systems and launchpads, and the corresponding approved manufacturers of the devices
  - Use only the latest test targets (acc. to ISO 19206)



### Bosch Comments Conclusion

# Bosch strongly supports NHTSA's goals

- New FMVSS requiring AEB and PAEB for passenger vehicles
- Engage with the industry to move forward with the adoption of this technology
- Supports a stepwise introduction of the proposed regulation to seamlessly integrate the required hardware





## Thank you!

