Ricon Corporation

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Dr. Steven Cliff
Acting Administrator
National Highway Traffic Administration
1200 New Jersey Avenue S.E.
West Building, W41-304
Washington D.C. 20590

August 26, 2021

Re: Petition for Inconsequential Treatment, Ricon Corp., 21E-069

Dear Administrator Cliff:

Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 30118(d) and 49 C.F.R. Part 556, enclosed please find a petition for inconsequential treatment submitted on behalf of Ricon Corp. related to recall 21E-069.

Please feel free to contact me with any questions.

Sincerely,

Frank Golemis
Director of Engineering
WABTEC Bus Products
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Enclosures

Ricon Corporation – Petition for Inconsequential Noncompliance

NHTSA Recall 21E-069

I. Introduction.

Ricon Corp. ("Ricon") is a leading manufacturer of wheelchair lifts and ramps for both public use and private use.[1] Ricon manufactures platform lifts that have been designed for use in specialized transit applications, including commercial vehicles, school buses and motorcoaches. Ricon's innovative products ensure the availability of safe and reliable access to transportation for the mobility impaired.

The lifts that are the subject of this petition are the Ricon Baylift Series wheelchair lifts (the "Baylifts"). The Baylift platform is a specialty product that is used exclusively in motorcoach buses. As a specialty product, the Baylifts are not produced on a regular basis and manufacturing begins only after Ricon receives a customer order. In July 2020, Ricon received an order from an OEM customer for several units of the Baylift model and given the passage of time, began to take steps to reevaluate the performance of the Baylift against FMVSS 403. Following its compliance review, on July 30, 2021, Ricon filed a Noncompliance Information Report (the "573 Report") pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 30118(d) and 49 C.F.R. § 573.6 identifying that 1,877 Baylifts do not adhere to certain provisions of FMVSS 403. There are four noncompliance issues identified in the 573 Report. These include two design issues related to the platform operating volume and the gap between the platform edge and outer barrier, as well as two performance issues related to the inner roll stop interlock sensing and the simultaneous activation of the control panel for the lift. *See* NHTSA Recall No. 21E-069 (attached).

Despite identifying the existence of these issues, none of them presents a safety risk, either when considered individually or as a whole. Thus, Ricon submits this petition in accordance with the provisions of 49 C.F.R. Part 556 requesting that it be exempted from the notification and remedy provisions under the Safety Act. Ricon is currently in the process of validating a production change for the lifts to address each of these items and has stopped the sale of the Baylifts in the interim.

II. Description of the Noncompliances.

Ricon has identified four areas where it has been determined that the Baylifts do not strictly adhere to the requirements of FMVSS 403. These issues relate to the design of platform and the performance of the wheelchair lifts. The noncompliances identified by Ricon are as follows: (1) the unobstructed operating volume of the platform (S6.4.2.1); (2) the gap between the outer platform edge and the fully deployed outer barrier (S6.4.4.3); (3) the inner roll stop interlock sensing test procedure (S7.6.3); and (4) the simultaneous activation of the lift control functions (S6.7.4). Each of these noncompliances is described in detail below. Ricon has produced the Baylifts since 2005 and Ricon is not aware of any reports or complaints from the field related to any of the topics at issue in this petition.

[1] Ricon's principal place of business is in San Fernando, California.

Platform Unobstructed Operating Volume – FMVSS 403, S6.4.2.1

FMVSS 403, S64.2.1, provides that the minimum platform operating volume for public use lifts is as follows:

> "[T]he sum of an upper part and a lower part . . . . The upper part is a rectangular solid whose base is 760 mm (30 in) by 1,220 mm (48 in) long, whose height is 711 mm (28 in), and whose base is tangent to the top surface of the lower rectangular solid (see Figure 3)."

The Baylift platform does not meet the unobstructed platform minimum operating volume at one particular location on the platform. FMVSS 403, S64.2.1, requires, in part, a minimum operating volume of 30 inches width at 2 inches above the platform surface. At one specific location, the upper part of the Baylift measures 29.38 inches wide (as compared to the required 30 inches) – a difference of approximately 0.62 inches. The platform operating volume is slightly impeded by the gas spring mounting hardware on the sides of the platform. The platform occupancy volume is restricted only at the specific location of the side barriers where the gas springs and mounting hardware are located, which is at the extreme inner edges of the platform. See Exhibit A, Baylift Platform Operating Volume Diagram. The platform meets the volume requirements in all other locations.

Gap between Outer Platform Edge and Fully Deployed Outer Barrier – FMVSS 403, S6.4.4.3

The Baylift has a gap between the edge of the outer platform and the fully deployed outer barrier that marginally exceeds the allowable width permitted by FMVSS 403. The test procedure outlined in S6.4.4.3 requires that the clearance test block specified in S.7.1.3 must not pass through any gap between the outer barrier and lift platform when the long axis is held perpendicular to the platform reference plane. On the Baylift, the gap between the edge of the outer platform and the fully deployed outer barrier is approximately 2.38 mm (or 0.094 inches) greater than the clearance test block. See Exhibit B, Outer Platform Edge and Outer Barrier Clearance Photo.

Inner Roll Stop Interlock – FMVSS 403, S7.6.3

The Baylift's inner roll stop interlock may not sense the presence of the front wheels of the wheelchair test device in certain limited locations when tested pursuant to the provisions of FMVSS 403, S7.6.3. When the lift platform is at vehicle floor height with the inner barrier in the fully down (i.e., non-deployed) position and a wheelchair test device is placed in certain locations on the inner barrier with one or two front wheels on the inner roll stop, the inner roll stop may begin to deploy even though a wheelchair is present.

The inner roll stop non-deployment interlock and occupied inner roll stop interlock test in FMVSS 403, S.7.6 outlines the following test procedure:

S.7.6.3 Reposition the platform at the vehicle floor level loading position. Place one front wheel of the wheelchair test device on the inner roll stop. If the platform is too small to maneuver one front wheel on the inner roll stop, two front wheels may be placed on the inner roll stop. Note the vertical distance between a horizontal plane (passing through the point of contact between the wheelchair test device wheel(s) and the upper surface of the inner roll stop) and the ground. Using the lift control, move the platform down until it stops.

The inner roll stop interlock deviation described above only occurs when tested under the test procedure set out in FMVSS 403, S.7.6. This test procedure is not consistent with loading and unloading under normal operating conditions for use of the Baylift platform and with industry practice.

Simultaneous Activation of Controls – FMVSS 403, S6.7.4

The Baylifts use an external control pendant to operate the lifts. The control pendant uses an on/off switch to energize and power the lift. To move and change the direction of the lift, the control pendant contains four individual buttons to operate the functions for stow, deploy, down and up positions. These four buttons are momentary switches, meaning that continuous pressure must be applied to the button in order to continue the movement or direction of the lift. Once the button is released, movement of the lift immediately stops. Photographs of the exemplar control pendant is provided in Exhibit C.

FMVSS 403, S6.7.4, provides that the control system for the platform lift must not allow the simultaneous activation of more than one function. The relevant provision states as follows:

S6.7.4 - Except for the POWER function described in S6.7.2.1, the control system specified in S6.7.2 must prevent the simultaneous performance of more than one function. If an initial function is actuated, then one or more other functions are actuated while the initial function remains actuated, the platform must either continue in the direction dictated by the initial function or stop. Verification of this requirement is made throughout the lift operations specified in S7.9.3 through S7.9.8.

Ricon has found that under two specific conditions, the control pendant used on the Baylifts permits the simultaneous activation of functions because it does not allow the initial function to continue in the initial direction or stop as directed in S6.7.4. In the first condition, the lift platform is located at vehicle floor level and is moving downwards to ground level by pressing the "DOWN" button on the control pendant. If the "UP" button is activated at the same time as the "DOWN" button, the lift platform will stop its downward motion and instead, initiate a normal upward motion. In the second condition, the unoccupied lift is already in a stowed position and is commanded to deploy by pressing the "DEPLOY" button on the control pendant. If the "STOW" button is pressed at the same time, the lift will stop the deploy process and instead revert to a normal stow motion. The Baylifts perform consistent with the requirements of S6.7.4 under all other conditions when the activation buttons are pushed simultaneously. As described in detail below, the potential for any simultaneous activation of functions would be highly unlikely and extremely difficult when holding the pendant with one hand and there are

further design features that exist to mitigate against the potential for injury in the event that it did occur.

III. Analysis.

From its inception, the Safety Act has included a provision recognizing that some noncompliances may pose little or no safety risk. In applying this recognition to particular fact situations, the agency considers whether the noncompliance gives rise to "a significantly greater risk than . . . in a compliant vehicle [or item of equipment]." 69 Fed. Reg. 19897, 900 (April 14, 2000).

A. The Performance of the Baylift Does Not Create A Safety Risk.

The Baylifts in the field do not create an enhanced safety risk. Ricon has continuously produced the Baylifts for more than a decade the product has been sold in the U.S. market for more than 20 years. The design and construction of the platform, the performance of the inner barrier interlock sensing, and the performance of the control pendant have remained unchanged since its inception. In all that time, Ricon has never received a claim or any information that suggests an incident or injury potentially related to these issues. Thus, while Ricon is in the process of verifying production changes to ensure the lifts are compliant with all necessary aspects of FMVSS 403, these updates would be enhancements to an already safe and proven product.

As described below, none of these issues either creates or contributes to an enhanced safety risk for the lift occupant or the operator. Each is discussed in detail below.

Unobstructed Platform Operating Volume

While the slight protrusion of the side barriers, gas springs and mounting hardware on the Baylift platform makes the overall volume slightly shy of the unobstructed platform minimum operating volume at one particular location, it does not pose a safety risk or deny access for mobility users. The FMVSS 403 rulemaking describes that the rationale for the unobstructed operating volume provision is to create a consistent platform size to ensure most users with mobility devices are able to access the platform and the vehicle. *See* 67 Fed. Reg. 79416, 424 (December 27, 2002). In the case of the Baylifts, even with the current condition, they are still able to meet the objective of this provision and the Baylifts continue to allow access for the vast majority of users. Further, the Baylifts are only installed in specialized over the road buses such as motorcoaches that are used for tour operations. The Baylifts are not designed for and are not used in public transit buses or other vehicles that are more commonly used to transport the mobility impaired on a day-to-day basis. Because of the limited and specialized environment in which the Baylifts are used, there is no risk that even with the current design of the platform, a user would be precluded from accessing the vehicle and being unable to carry out their essential daily activities.

In addition to the operating environment, there is little to no risk that a user would be precluded from accessing the motorcoach via the Baylift because the platform should still accommodate the majority of mobility devices. The width of a standard adult-sized manual

powered wheelchair contained in the ADA regulations is 26 inches, well below the 29.38 inch width of the Baylifts.[2] Ricon has also surveyed the offerings of major mobility device manufacturers and found that out of 45 powered wheelchairs only 3 measured 30 inches wide or more (two of which are foldable wheelchairs) and of 14 scooters only 1 exceeded a 30 inch width. (A copy of the spreadsheet with this material is provided as an attachment).

Given the types of mobility device offerings in the market, the minor deviation in the platform volume width at the extreme upper part of the platform would have no impact on the ability of a user with a standard wheelchair to traverse the lift platform and limited, if any effect on powered mobility device users. While there are a limited number of mobility devices that exceed the standard width of 26 inches, in developing the platform volume standard and setting the dimensions, NHTSA long ago recognized and accepted that not all mobility devices could necessarily be accommodated through the platform volume provision. *See* 67 Fed. Reg. at 79424 (recognizing "some concerns that lifts designed to only meet the minimum operating volume may preclude some users from using a public use lift. However, today's requirement is based on existing requirements and the existing design of most lifts.") Furthermore, Ricon is not aware of any reports that a user was denied access because of the minor deviation in the width of the platform.

If Ricon were required to remedy the Baylifts to provide an overall 30 inch width, including at the location of the gas springs, this would entail a complete redesign of the product. The agency has recognized and respected the practical limitations and expenditure of resources to require manufacturers to redesign platform lifts to accommodate a minimal change. (*See id.* "If we were to specify a larger minimum operating volume, we believe a significant number of lifts would have to be redesigned before they could be certified as compliant.") In summary, a deviation of approximately 0.62 inches at the extreme edge of the upper part of the platform does not increase the risk of a user being unable to access the vehicle nor does it create a safety risk to users who are able to access the vehicle and lift.

Outer Barrier Gap

The marginal exceedance of the allowable gap between the edge of the outer platform and the fully deployed outer barrier of approximately 2.38 mm (0.094 inches)) does not present a safety risk. Images of the gap when measured against the testing block are attached. As depicted in the images, the gap allows the testing block to bend slightly within the space, however, the size of the gap with the exceedance is so small that it does not create an open space or a void between the testing block and the metal edge of the gap.

The purpose of this provision is to ensure that the user's mobility device does not become lodged in the gap. However, in the Baylifts, because the deviation is extremely slight, it does not present an increased safety risk to occupants using mobility devices. For instance, the

[2] https://www.ada.gov/descript/reg3a/figA3ds.htm

standard size of the tip of a walking cane is ¾ inch and would not be affected by this deviation. Wheelchair wheels are not impacted by this deviation as the drive wheels and caster wheels are substantially larger than the width of the gap. For example, standard drive wheels are approximately 24 inches and the caster wheels begin at approximately 3 inches in diameter.[3] As the wheelchair or mobility device enters and exits the platform, the wheels or base of the device should be oriented facing straight ahead and not to the side. With this orientation, there is no opportunity for the wheel or base to slip into the gap even in the unlikely scenario that a device had an extremely small base installed. Additionally, users of motorcoaches are typically aided by trained personnel during entry and exit of the platform, reducing the risk of the user falling or tripping if they are using a device such as a walker or cane. Moreover, a user in a wheelchair would already be in a seated position, thus there is no risk of the occupant falling or becoming unstable.

Ricon is not aware of any reports of injury or complaints from the field related to the slight exceedance in the allowable gap between the outer platform edge and fully deployed outer barrier on the Baylifts.

Inner Roll Stop Interlock

The inner roll stop interlock may not meet the performance requirement when tested under the specific conditions of the test procedure in FMVSS 403, S7.6. However, the conditions in the test procedure are not consistent with the manner in which the platform is loaded and unloaded in normal operating conditions. Specifically, the Baylift operating procedures state that the user mobility device should be loaded with the rear wheels of the wheelchair first.[4] Under these loading and unloading conditions, the rear wheels would be sensed by the inner roll stop and the interlock would be activated. Moreover, in normal operating conditions, users are aided by trained personnel during entry and exit of the platform which monitor the occupant throughout the entire entry and exit process. As such, it would be very unlikely that a wheelchair occupant would be placed in the direction as described in the test procedure and in the unlikely event of misorienting the occupant so that the inner roll stop began to move the mobility device, the trained operator could take steps to prevent any harm or injury to the occupant.

Ricon is not aware of any reports of injury or complaints related to the operation of the inner roll stop interlock in the field.

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[3] See examples provided at: https://www.cewheelsinc.com/3-tips-choosing-better-wheelchair-wheels/ https://enableyourlife.com/buying-guide-casters.asp

[4] A copy of the Baylift operating instructions which indicate the occupant should enter the lift rear wheels first can be accessed at the following link: https://www.riconcorp.com/pdfs/32dble03/32dble03B.pdf

See video providing step-by-step instructions on the loading process and indicating loading is via rear wheels first at the following link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xbbx2GvGBcA

Control Pendant

The potential for simultaneous activation of the "UP"/"DOWN" or "STOW"/"DEPLOY" buttons is extremely unlikely as due to the geometry of the pendant and buttons. The pendant device measures approximately 2.8 inches wide / 4.5 inches long / 1.7 inches thick and is composed of hard plastic which does not yield to force. The buttons are spaced out approximately 1.25 inches between centers across the top surface of the pendant device. An image of the control pendant is provided as an attachment at Exhibit B. This geometry would make it difficult for the operator to wrap their hand around the back of the pendant or contort their hand across the top of the pendant to activate multiple buttons at once. Because of the difficulty the operator would have in reaching the pendant buttons with one hand given the geometry and dimensions of the pendant and button spacing, there is essentially no risk of an operator accidentally activating more than one command at the same time.

Further, the pendants use four individual push style buttons that utilize a momentary switch to cause the lift to move up/down or stow/deploy. A separate button must be pressed downwards for each function. The design of the buttons and the way they are integrated into the pendant case precludes the activation of multiple features at the same time. The buttons are flush with the surface of the pendant case in their normal position or are recessed into individual button cavities within the pendant case when depressed. This button design precludes the accidental activation of more than one function because the operator has to actively press the button downwards, into the pendant case. In other words, simply making contact with the button surface alone will not activate the function, force must be actively applied to the button to engage it.

In the event that the operator did happen to activate both the up/down or stow/deploy buttons at the same time, because of the momentary switch design, the lift can only be activated for as long as the operator holds down the button. As soon as the two buttons are released, the lift immediately stops movement.

Further, the control device does not meet the language of the standard in only two limited conditions. In the first condition, in the unlikely event that the operator continued to hold down both the "DOWN" and "UP" buttons at once, the lift would change direction from the intended downwards movement and instead begin a normal upwards motion. If the lift were to switch to an upwards motion, the upward velocity would be less than or equal to 152 mm (6 inches) per second which falls within the requirements for maximum platform velocity under FVMSS 403, S6.2.2.1. At this low speed, there is little to no risk of a passenger becoming unstable. Further, all occupants (both standing and seated) must be secured within the platform by a safety belt, which is a redundant safety feature that adds an additional layer of protection.

In the other condition, simultaneous activation could only potentially occur when the lift is located in the stowed position and is being commanded to deploy. There is also no safety risk in the unlikely event that the operator depressed the buttons for "DEPLOY" and "STOW" simultaneously because the lift would be unoccupied in the first instance in order to deploy the lift from the stow position. Therefore, there is no risk to the platform occupant even if the two buttons were pressed at the same time.

C. NHTSA Has Previously Granted Petitions Where Platform Lifts Did Not Meet the Performance Requirements of FMVSS 403.

The agency has granted inconsequentiality petitions where the manufacturer has not met the precise design or performance requirements of FMVSS 403 on the basis that the noncompliance did not pose an increased risk to safety as the lift is used in the real world. The performance of Ricon's Baylift is consistent with this precedent.

For example, the agency granted a petition where the lift handrails did not meet the values for deflection force. While the handrails collapsed when exposed to forces above the threshold requirement, the handrails did not collapse or fail catastrophically. The agency explained that its concern in instituting the deflection force requirement was the possibility of a catastrophic failure of the handrails which would expose the occupant to a risk of injury. In granting the petition, the agency "anticipated that future tests will specify placement and direction of forces that will be more focused to address worst case handrail displacement and real world safety problems." The agency recognized the noncompliance in this case did not "pose a safety concern[] that the handrail requirements were intended to address." *See* 72 Fed. Reg. 19754 (April 19, 2007).

As with this finding, there is little to no risk of harm or injury in real world use of the Baylifts. The slight design deviations in the unobstructed platform operating volume and the gap between the outer platform and fully deployed outer barrier do not present any risks to user safety, nor have these issues denied access to the vehicle for any mobility device users. Moreover, although the inner roll stop interlock may not meet the performance requirement when tested under the specific conditions of the test procedure, those conditions are inconsistent with the manner in which the platform is loaded and unloaded in normal and real world operating conditions. Thus, under normal operating conditions, the inner roll stop interlock performs as required and not present any risk to the occupant.

As described above, there is little to no potential that an operator could actually cause two lift functions to operate simultaneously when the control pendant is operated with one hand. The size of the pendant and the design of the buttons, in inverted cavities or flush against the surface of the pendant, preclude an operator from accidentally pressing more than one button at once. Should the simultaneous activation occur nonetheless, the lift could not engage in a stow operation if it was occupied. If the lift "DOWN" and "UP" buttons were pressed simultaneously and the lift began to move upwards, the movement is a normal upwards motion that occurs at the same pace as any other upwards (or downwards) movement and would not be jolting to the occupant even if caught by surprise. The lift would immediately cease operation as soon as the operator releases the button and stops applying pressure. At all times, the lift occupant is securely restrained within the lift platform which provides a secondary level of protection to prevent the occupant from becoming unstable.

Ricon has used this same design in its Baylift for decades and is not aware of any claims or injury involving the platform occupancy volume or gap, inner roll stop interlock, or performance of the control pendant.

IV. Conclusion.

Ricon has, in good faith, undertaken a comprehensive compliance review of the Baylift wheelchair lift. While Ricon identified discrepancies between the requirements of FMVSS 403 and the lifts themselves, under a commonsense approach, the deviations do not rise to the level of enhancing any potential risk to passenger safety. Based upon the foregoing data and information, Ricon requests that the agency make a finding that the noncompliances identified in the Baylift is inconsequential to motor vehicle safety and that Ricon be relieved of its notice and remedy obligations.

Exhibit A


Inner Roll Stop
29.75"
Between RH & LH Springs
~8.75" from "C" Axis to Top End of Gas Spring
RH Gas Spring
C
29.38" Between RH & LH Hinge Points
B
>2" from surface of platform
Confidential Business Information


Ricon
Faiveley ACCESS & MOBILITY
A Wabtec company

Exhibit B

Exhibit B

Exhibit C



Part 573 Safety Recall Report 21E-069

Manufacturer Name : Ricon Corporation
Submission Date : JUL 30, 2021
NHTSA Recall No. : 21E-069
Manufacturer Recall No. : NR

Manufacturer Information :

Manufacturer Name : Ricon Corporation
Address : 1135 Aviation Place
San Fernando CA 91340-1460
Company phone : 818-267-3000

Population :

Number of potentially involved : 1,877
Estimated percentage with defect : 100 %

Equipment Information :

Brand / Trade 1 : Ricon
Model : Baylift Wheelchair Lift
Part No. : RISSBF3XXX-XX
Size : NR
Function : Platform Lifts
Descriptive Information : All Ricon Baylift Series Wheelchair Lifts produced between April 2005 or October 2012 (depending on the effective date for the particular provision at issue) and April 22, 2020.

Begin: April 1, 2005 for Unobstructed Platform Operating Volume (S6.4.2), and outer barrier Gap Width (S6.4.4.3); and October 2, 2012 for Inner Roll Stop Interlock (S6.10.2.7), and Simultaneous Activation (S6.7.4).

End: April 22, 2020

Production Dates : APR 01, 2005 - APR 22, 2020

Description of Noncompliance :

Description of the Noncompliance :	The lift platform does not meet the unobstructed platform minimum operating volume at one particular location on the platform. The provision at S6.4.2.1 requires, in part, a minimum operating volume of 30 inches width at 2 inches above the platform surface. At the specific location of the lift platform counterbalance gas springs, the slight protrusion of the gas springs and the gas spring mounting hardware reduces the platform clear width to approximately 755.7 mm (29.75 inches) between the gas springs and 746.3 mm (29.38 inches) at the specific location of the gas spring mounting hardware . The platform meets the volume requirements in all other locations. The gap between the edge of the outer platform and the fully deployed outer barrier is marginally larger (approximately 2.38 mm (0.094 inches)) than the clearance test block specified in S7.1.3 and may allow the test block to pass through the gap when the long axis is held perpendicular to the platform reference plane as required in S6.4.4.3. The inner roll stop interlock may not sense the presence of the wheelchair test device in certain limited locations when tested to the provisions of S7.6.3. When the lift platform is at vehicle floor height with the inner barrier in the fully down (non-deployed) position and a wheelchair test device is placed in certain locations on the inner barrier with 1 or 2 front wheels on the inner roll stop, the inner roll stop may begin to deploy even though there is a wheelchair present. The wheelchair lift control does not conform to the simultaneous activation requirements of FMVSS 403 section S6.7.4 for the DEPLOY and DOWN command functions.
FMVSS 1 :	403 - Platform lift systems
FMVSS 2 :	NR
Description of the Safety Risk :	There is no risk to occupant safety for any of the issues described above. The platform occupancy volume requirement was put in place to ensure that the platform is sufficiently large to accommodate most occupants and their mobility devices. For the Baylift, occupants are able to fully access the platform and make entry onto the vehicle despite the marginally smaller platform volume in the specific location of the platform gas springs. With regard to the platform gap width, the increased width of the gap between the outer platform and the fully deployed outer barrier presents a slight exceedance that is approximately 2.38 mm (0.094 inches). With regard to the simultaneous activation of the DEPLOY and DOWN functions, simultaneous activation is not possible with a single hand or finger based on the design of the control pendant case and under normal operating conditions. Finally, although the inner roll stop interlock may not meet the performance requirement when tested under the specific conditions of the test procedure, those conditions are inconsistent with the manner in which the platform is loaded and unloaded in normal operating conditions. Ricon intends to submit

	a petition for inconsequential noncompliance with regard to each of these issues. Ricon is not aware of any reports of injury or complaints from the field related to any of the above listed noncompliance conditions.
Description of the Cause :	NR
Identification of Any Warning that can Occur :	None.

Involved Components :

Component Name :	NR
Component Description :	NR
Component Part Number :	NR

Supplier Identification :

Component Manufacturer

Name :	NR
Address :	NR
	NR
Country :	NR

Chronology :

The Baylift is a specialty product that is used in motorcoach buses. Ricon has produced and sold a relatively low volume of Baylifts since it was offered in 2005. In July 2020, Ricon received an OEM order for several units of the Baylift model. After receiving this order and given the passage of time since the operation of the Baylift was previously considered, Ricon began to take steps to reevaluate the Baylift against FMVSS 403. In August 2020, Ricon put processes into place to prevent the shipment of any Baylift units to customers until the evaluation was finalized. In Fall 2020, preliminary findings were considered against an exemplar Baylift and Baylift design documents, however, the lack of a top level CAD model (a complete CAD model that allows for detailed evaluation of all assembled part dimensions) complicated the analysis and in November 2020, a second exemplar model was produced so that Ricon could continue its analysis. When the analysis of this exemplar model also did not provide certainty as to the performance of certain aspects of the lift, Ricon started the process of generating a top level CAD model that could be used to analyze the parts and dimensions. Ricon then reviewed whether the potential concerns that had initially been identified in fact presented a noncompliance. This evaluation was carried out through Spring 2021. On July 19, 2021, Ricon met with NHTSA

to review and discuss certain substantive and process oriented issues regarding its consideration of the Baylift. On July 23, 2021, Ricon submitted a noncompliance information report for an issue related to the force which the outer barrier was capable of retaining and advised in its report that Ricon will remedy the issue on units in the field. On July 26, 2021, Ricon determined that the noncompliances described in this report existed in the Baylift model lift, but that those issues did not present a risk to motor vehicle safety and Ricon would submit an inconsequentiality petition.

Description of Remedy :

Description of Remedy Program :	Ricon plans to submit a petition for inconsequential noncompliance for the issues identified above
How Remedy Component Differs from Recalled Component :	(1) On new production lifts, Ricon plans to incorporate a redesigned outer platform hinge and pin geometry that will comply with the minimum unobstructed lower platform width of 725 mm (28.5 inches) from 50 mm (2 inches) to 760 mm (30 inches) above the platform surface. Furthermore, the inner and outer platforms on new production lifts will be lengthened to achieve a width of 30" above 50 mm (2 inches) from the surface of the platform within the required 1219.2 mm (48 inches) length of the usable platform surface. Ricon's intent for new production lifts was discussed with NHTSA and Ricon is awaiting any feedback from NHTSA to the contrary. (2) New production lifts will incorporate a slightly extended outer platform to reduce the gap between the edge of the platform and the deployed outer barrier within the maximum allowable limit of 15.9 mm (0.625 inches). (3) New production lifts will incorporate an inner barrier occupant sensing device that will detect, through the application of pressure, the presence of an occupant or test device throughout the width and length of the inner barrier. Actuation of this device will stop deployment of the inner barrier and prevent the lowering of the platform in accordance with the requirements of S6.10.2.7. (4) New production lift controllers will incorporate an updated version of software that will prevent simultaneous performance of more than one function during the lift's "DOWN" and "DEPLOY" functional states.
Identify How/When Recall Condition was Corrected in Production :	NR

Recall Schedule :

Description of Recall Schedule :	NR
Planned Dealer Notification Date :	NR - NR

Planned Owner Notification Date : NR - NR

Purchaser Information :

The following manufacturers purchased this defective/noncompliant equipment for possible use or installation in new motor vehicles or new items of motor vehicle equipment:

Name : NR
Address : NR
NR
Country : NR
Company Phone : NR

* NR - Not Reported