OMB Control No.: 2127-0004

# Part 573 Safety Recall Report

## 19V-842

**Manufacturer Name:** Transportation Collaborative, Inc.

NHTSA Recall No.: 19V-842

Manufacturer Recall No.: NR



### **Manufacturer Information:**

Manufacturer Name: Transportation Collaborative, Inc.

Address: 7 Lake Station Road

Warwick NY 10990

Company phone: 845-988-0419

## **Population:**

Number of potentially involved: 9
Estimated percentage with defect: 100 %

#### **Vehicle Information:**

Vehicle 1: 2019-2020 TransTech Bus CST & SST Vehicle Type: BUSES, MEDIUM & HEAVY VEHICLES

Body Style : Power Train : NR

Descriptive Information: TransTech Bus was contacted by SafeFleet, parent company of Specialty

Manufacturing Co., on July 11th, 2019 regarding recall 19E-042. SafeFleet provided

arranged a phone conference with TransTech Bus, providing a PowerPoint

presentation and supporting recall notice documentation regarding their Prolo Roof Hatch 92XX-XXXXX Series. SafeFleet identified a specific product, production lot, and range for said product. SafeFleet provided TransTech Bus with the purchase order history of this part, 11 (eleven) in total are affected and installed on TransTech Bus vehicles. This covers all 92XX-XXXXX Series Series glass hatches produced between

8/1/18 and 5/21/19

Production Dates: NOV 01, 2018 - APR 30, 2019

VIN Range 1 : Begin : NR End : NR Not sequential

### **Description of Defect:**

Description of the Defect: Prolo roof hatches (emergency exits) utilize a die cast zinc handle for the

external release handle. Certain production lots of these cast handles were found to contain a higher than allowed/specified level of porosity or voids. The excess porosity and voids can create failure points in the handle leading to breakage under reasonable use. Presence of voids/porosity can be determined by part weight but this does not guarantee failure of the part - location and concentration of the defects are key to the failure mode. The estimated 20% covers suspect components that show a low part weight (indicates the

presence of porosity and voids) but does indicate failure rate.

FMVSS 1: 217 - Bus emergency exits and window retention and release

FMVSS 2: NR

Description of the Safety Risk: Failure of the external release handle will prevent the hatch release

mechanism from being actuated from outside the vehicle. The hatch can still be opened from the outside by venting the hatch and actuating the inside release handle however this operation is not intuitive and not detailed in the required instructions located on the hatch. Failure of the external release handle does not prevent actuation of the release mechanism from inside the

vehicle.

Description of the Cause: The defects were a result of casting process inconsistencies at component

supplier. The casting mold temperature ran outside of spec in one section of the mold. This caused the injected zinc to cool too rapidly creating porosity and

voids in the stem of the cast external release handle.

Identification of Any Warning No visual or audible warning.

that can Occur:

## **Supplier Identification:**

## **Component Manufacturer**

Name: Specialty Manufacturing Co.

Address: 13501 S. Ridge Drive

Charlotte NORTH CAROLINA 28273

**Country: United States** 

### **Chronology:**

Thomas Bus notified Safe Fleet on 3/13/19 of a broken outer Prolo handle that was found at their inspection station. A review of customer complaints and warranty data showed no other reports of broken handles.

On 5/20/19, another School Bus OEM notified Safe Fleet of a broken handle during their inspection process.

This prompted an immediate review of the Prolo production line. Which revealed that there were handles on the line with similar internal appearances. Prolo production was suspended upon further investigation

## **Description of Remedy:**

Description of Remedy Program: To remedy affected units, Safe Fleet will provide materials and labor for

any Prolo hatch with a Safe Fleet build date between August 30, 2018 and

May 20, 2019 to have the 009336 outer handle replaced.

How Remedy Component Differs On 5/20/19 all stock in the warehouse was placed in quarantine. from Recalled Component: Containment was determined by the part weight. Testing identified a correlation between the part weight and the overall strength of the part

(due to voids and porosity). All handles (part number 009336) were only released from quarantined after certification of the part weight. All out of

spec parts remained in

quarantine. Production resumed on 5/21/19 with only certified in-spec

handles All units in the

Safe Fleet warehouse had the handles replaced before being taken out of

quarantine.

Identify How/When Recall Condition Upon contacting the supplier of the handles, their review determined the

was Corrected in Production: root

cause to be: the die was not at the proper operating temperature during the casting

process.

A low die temperature causes the material to skin over before the air inside the cavity can reach the parting line vents. The air, will instead, accumulate in a thick cross section

resulting in voids and porosity.

Safe Fleet has sent representatives to the foundry to review the issue as well as the implementation of the necessary corrective

actions.

### **Recall Schedule:**

Description of Recall Schedule: NR

Planned Dealer Notification Date: DEC 04, 2019 - DEC 13, 2019 Planned Owner Notification Date: DEC 04, 2019 - DEC 13, 2019

<sup>\*</sup> NR - Not Reported